2 NATO's institutional decline in post-Cold War security governance

Rafael Biemann

Since 9/11 and the Iraq war, the post-Cold War debate on the future of NATO has taken a turn. The first debate, until the mid-1990s, was dominated by a forceful constructivist and neoliberal assault on neorealism's premature claim that NATO, lacking its former opponent, would dissolve. Alliance theory obviously needed considerable refinement. There was an inconsistent twist in this debate, though. Realists who during the Cold War had unduly privileged system stability and were thus rightfully criticized for having missed the ideational, normative and domestic level indicators of change as the Soviet Empire began to crumble (Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995) now themselves became the heralds of change, forecasting NATO's demise. Conversely, constructivists who were so adroit (at least in hindsight) in explaining the change of 1989-90 now began to privilege continuity, namely the "surprising persistence" of NATO (Duffield 1994-5: 764). Their basic guiding question was: Why did NATO survive?

By the mid-1990s, NATO had embarked on Eastern enlargement, new partnership arrangements and what was then called out-of-area operations. The alliance was proactively embracing multiple new raisons d'être that seemed to belie all doomsday scenarios. Constructivists and neoliberals forwarded a plethora of explanations for NATO's persistence: the adaptability of the general assets of this multipurpose alliance (Wallander 2000); the transformation into an inclusive, risk-oriented security management organization (Wallander and Keohane 1999); the organizational self-interest of NATO's bureaucrats; the high transaction costs of creating a new institution and the broad domestic support for the alliance (McCalla 1996); and the growth of a German community of liberal democratic norms and values (Risse-Kappen 1995a). The latter explanation's focus on socialization, collective bonds and a sense of common history is still prevalent in theory-driven analyses after Iraq (Ghezica 2005; Risse 2004; Sjursen 2004).

Valid as these arguments were, they were overstated. Indicators of change were understated; the status quo was too easily projected into the future. In hindsight, the entire thrust of the first debate seems questionable. Indeed, the remaining skeptics who anticipated increasing policy disagreements, warning of a challenge to "the stability of the entire NATO edifice" (Duke 1994: 188), proved themselves right less than a decade later when the Iraq war split the alliance. Most observers agree that NATO is no longer "vibrant... robust and healthy" (McCalla 1996: 446, 454). The alliance has slid into the "gravest crisis of its history" (Dembinski 2005a: 1).

It is, however, the future projection of current trends that is in dispute. Is this crisis a temporary one, like so many NATO has mastered in its history, or does it have a different quality? Some argue that NATO has already crossed the "Rubicon" and is "more or less irrelevant" (Cox 2005: 208, 224). Others insist that the transatlantic security community is still "alive and well" (Pouliot 2006: 119). The polling data can be interpreted both ways. Those seeing the glass half full argue that NATO's declining support is still along the lines of former alliance crises. After each crisis, European attitudes rebounded. Optimists might also argue that appreciation of NATO was always a function of overall transatlantic relations, and that prospects for NATO might improve after the Bush presidency.

Skeptics can argue that after the Iraq war public opinion did not rebound. Those who assumed that a "new transatlantic consensus could swiftly be re-established" proved too optimistic (Moravcsik 2003: 89). Overall, only 53 percent of Europeans see NATO still as "essential" (Transatlantic Trends 2007: 16). Skeptics might also point to quite dramatic downturns in public opinion of traditional NATO advocates. In 2007 only 56 percent of Britons perceived NATO still as "essential," compared to 76 percent in 2002; previously the historic low was 65 percent (Ziegler 1998: 17). In the US, likewise, 56 percent still see NATO as "essential," 30 percent not (2002 figures, Worldviews 2002: 28). In Germany the drop was from 74 percent to 55 percent - also a historic low (Simnoti 1997: 11). In Italy support for NATO fell from 68 percent to 52 percent and in Poland from 64 percent to 48 percent, both in 2006 (Transatlantic Trends 2006: 7). In Turkey the decline was even down to 35 percent (Transatlantic Trends 2007: 22).

Uncertainty is widespread. For many, the alliance is increasingly obsolete, appearing to some as a relic from a period gladly overcome, to others as a military instrument of negligible value in today's security environment. Will we finally observe the demise of the alliance, as forecast by Stephen Walt and others? Was it just the ebbing power accumulated during four decades of socialization which prevented NATO from falling apart sooner? How relevant is NATO in the new security environment?

This chapter explores the advantages of applying a security governance lens to answer these questions. It aspires to complement rather than to substitute for other lenses which have been applied to analyze the changes in Euro-Atlantic security following the end of the Cold War, including organizational and network theory (Biermann 2008a; Krahmann 2005a). Security governance is still at an early stage of theory building. Findings are quite disparate because conceptualizations differ strongly (Kirchner and Sperling 2007; Krahmann 2003; Webber et al. 2004; Webber 2007). This chapter highlights those aspects that are of specific explanatory value for one single actor, NATO, in the web of actors constituting Euro-Atlantic security governance today.

I build on the theoretical framework James A. Sperling has presented in the introduction to this volume. My starting-point is a conceptualization of institutional
relevance as perceived by major member-states. This relevance is determined by exogenous (external environment) and endogenous variables (within the institution). The charm of Sperling’s approach is that it does not only focus on the exogenous variables the governance literature usually discusses, but also includes domestic-level variables which impact on intra-institutional affairs.

The main argument of this chapter is that NATO is experiencing a period of relative institutional decline. Short-term effects like the Bush presidency or Iraq should not obscure the structural nature of this decline. It is caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/9) and accelerated by 9/11. Even though NATO managed to gain new legitimacy by shifting its institutional purpose to conflict resolution, enlargement and partnership, four tectonic shifts decrease the relevance of the alliance for its core members: first, a process of transatlantic decoupling since the Soviet threat dissipated; second, the rise of European assertiveness in security and defense, challenging NATO’s primacy in its new core competences; third, the multiplication of security providers which turned NATO into an instrument of choice for regional and global security governance; and fourth, America’s gradual de-prioritization of the alliance as security cultures on both sides of the Atlantic move apart. These shifts had already unfolded in the 1990s. The Bush presidency both epitomized these shifts in the extreme and deflected attention from their structural quality. The shifts cumulate to reduce the relevance of NATO both for the US and for European governments, though to varying degrees. Reversing this vector is exceedingly difficult.

The chapter has three sections: the first introduces a concept of institutional relevance and inserts a security governance perspective into this framework. The second section analyzes NATO’s relevance in post-Cold War security governance, discussing the four tectonic shifts outlined above. The third section draws conclusions for the security governance concept in general and NATO’s relevance in particular.

Institutional relevance

It is a myth that institutions “never die.” After all, their mortality rate is “surprisingly high”—one third of all international organizations were dissolved between 1981 and 1992 alone, the Warsaw Pact and Comecon being the most prominent ones (Shanks et al. 1996: 594). Indeed, the number of “dissolved or apparently inactive” intergovernmental organizations worldwide has been rising dramatically since the late 1970s, up to 671 in 2005 (Yearbook of International Organizations 2006:7/7: 33, 37, 39). However, not all institutions are dissolved or deactivated. Reducing the analysis to the extreme poles of “prosper or die,” as the first debate on NATO’s survival after the Cold War did, is simplistic and misleading; there is much in-between. This is where NATO comes in today.

We actually know very little as to why and how institutions decline. Dying or marginalized institutions are not very attractive objects of study. Creation and change of institutions has received far more attention (McCalla 1996: 461). Still, identifying indicators, i.e. early signals of decline might help us to determine where institutions “stand” in their life cycle and, policy-wise, what to do about it. Dissolution or desertification is mostly preceded by a period of decline.

I argue that the life cycle of an institution is determined by its relevance. So far, institutional relevance has not been conceptualized to my knowledge. This chapter starts from four assumptions derived from institutionalism. First, institutional relevance is one degree of ranking, ranging from low to high, and it is task-related, varying across issues. For NATO, we have to look at “old” functions (such as collective defense) and new ones (such as crisis management). We have to determine its relevance both in European and global governance. Also, we consider the totality of security tasks NATO members face today: which ones are assigned to NATO, which ones are not?

Second, relevance is perceptual (Hard 1999: 381). Member-states, representatives of international bureaucracies and populations often disagree as to the relevance of an organization. Because of the primary delegation authority of member-states, we actually look at NATO from the standpoint of its major members, focusing particularly on the American and the (as much as possible aggregate) European perspective. It is the cost-benefit calculus of these members which drives the delegation of mandates, tasks and resources to NATO (Hawkins et al. 2006).

Third, institutional relevance fluctuates over time. The UN Security Council lost relevance in 1947–8 when the emerging Cold War posed “West” and “East” against one another; its paralysis was temporarily overcome after 1989. Decline can be reversed; the “revitalization” of the Western European Union in 1984 is an example (Rees 1998). Thus, signals of decline should not be easily projected into the future. We should not underestimate the “adaptability” of institutions (Wallander et al. 1999: 12).

Fourth, more important than snapshots are trends, especially if they are sustained by long-term structural factors that resist political control. In the timeframe we are looking at, the system shocks of 11/9 and 9/11 triggered structural change in security cultures and security governance, which deeply impacted on NATO’s relevance. However, determining trends requires fixing a point of reference in time to allow for comparison. The reference point here is NATO’s “centrality” in European security up to 1989 (Wallander et al. 1999: 13).

What are meaningful indicators of decline? Some can be derived from the history of dissolved or deactivated institutions so far. First, major members leaving an organization; this happened when Britain and Denmark (1973), Portugal (1986), Austria, Sweden and Finland (all 1995) joined the EU and left the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Second, institutional preferences shifting to other institutions; this occurred when the democratizing countries of Central Eastern Europe since 1989 turned towards the EU and NATO and away from Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. Third, the willingness of member-states to sideline an institution by duplicating some of its major institutional functions; this took place when NATO was created and effectively replaced the Brussels Treaty Organization. Fourth, the non-use of a focal organization for purposes it is designed for, such as of the UN Security Council for mandating both NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo 1999 and the Iraq war 2003.
Institutional decline is motivated by three major factors: the loss of legitimacy, utility, and cohesiveness. International organizations lose relevance if their legitimacy wanes, if their usefulness as instruments to further member-state interests is in doubt and if the unity of purpose among member-states erodes. As a consequence, institutional loyalty wanes and preferences shift to other security providers.

For our purposes, it is most important to determine which variables produce declining institutional legitimacy, utility, and cohesiveness. We need to consider exogenous and endogenous variables. Both changes in the environment of institutions and changes within the member-states impact on intra-organizational affairs (Wallander and Keohane 1999: 29). I do not argue that the following variables are exhaustive. However, they are pivotal determinants of the relevance of security institutions and can help to measure NATO’s post-Cold War relevance.

Exogenous variables: embeddedness and threat perceptions

The security governance lens is particularly helpful to approach the exogenous variables. Taking primarily a system perspective, it looks at the interaction of the plethora of security providers we find today, ranging from international governmental to non-governmental organizations and private security companies (see the definitions in Welber et al. 2004: 8). NATO’s relevance in this multi-actor setting is relative. Its network position is defined by its embeddedness (Guiltni and Gurgiulo 1999: 1448). This relational profile has become part of its corporate identity and shapes its policy output (Biermann 2008a). We have to assess NATO’s relevance from this system perspective, for example by looking at the rise of rival institutions such as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and their impact on NATO.

Sperling’s (Introduction, this volume) primary system-level variable is threat perceptions. Shifting sources and targets of threat over time strongly shape the relevance of actors such as NATO, particularly their legitimacy and utility. As threat perceptions evolve, security agendas shift. Some tasks assume prominence, others recede. Since individual security providers are designed to meet specific threats, their relative relevance varies accordingly. Adaptation is the means to remain relevant.

Endogenous variables: “Westphalianess”

Traditionally, the security governance literature hardly considers domestic-level variables. Sperling’s approach is different. He takes a bottom-up approach, arguing that security governance systems are largely determined by state preferences which are derived from their security cultures, particularly their degree of “Westphalianess.” Actors with Westphalian identities tend to cling to Westphalian security systems, whereas actors turning post-Westphalian favor post-Westphalian security systems. This explains much of the difference we see today in regional security governance, for example comparing Western Europe and the Balkans, the Caucasus or the Middle East.

Thus, in order to understand security governance systems, we need to look at the Westphalian profile of their constituent parts (Biersteker 2005; Higgott 2005; Wallace 1999). The “Westphalianess” of states and institutions can be measured along several dimensions: in how far actors have moved from exclusive to inclusive images of Self and Other; in how far they have moved from a focus on territorial integrity, borders and sovereignty to positively identifying with pooled sovereignty, interdependence and integration, including the primacy of international law; in how far they have moved from a preoccupation with national security to the idea of an “international society” (Ball 1995); and in how far norms have shifted from coercive, hard-power to persuasive, soft-power approaches. These are ideal-types. In reality, we find a “continuum bounded by the Westphalian and post-Westphalian forms” (Sperling, Introduction, this volume). Actors can be located on this continuum. Sperling introduced three types: Westphalian, late-Westphalian, and post-Westphalian.

Security institutions are composite actors. The “Westphalianess” of each member may vary along the entire spectrum from Westphalian to post-Westphalian. When basic identities are in harmony, security communities form and thrive. When they diverge, cohesiveness suffers, as security communities rest on the “we-feeling” (Anderson 2006) among their members. To a large extent, this depends on like-mindedness in terms of identities and interests. The amount to which members of a security institution adhere to the classical attributes of the Westphalian state is one crucial indicator of their like-mindedness. Thus, this domestic-level variable strongly shapes member-state interaction on the intra-organizational level.

Based on this analytical framework, we will now identify the major causal factors impacting on NATO’s relevance in the post-Cold War era. Five structural shifts will be assessed: NATO’s shift to conflict resolution and partnership; transatlantic decoupling; European “emancipation” via the ESDP; the multiplication of security providers; and the US de-prioritisation of NATO.

NATO’s post-Cold War relevance

The shift to conflict resolution and partnership

NATO was the linchpin organization of the collective defense system which dominated the Cold War. According to Sperling (Introduction, this volume), this is one form of security governance, besides collective security, Westphalian security community, and post-Westphalian security community systems. In collective defense systems, the security referent is an identifiable enemy outside the group; the mechanisms for conflict management are defense, deterrence and balancing, and the strong security dilemma motivates in-group unity and out-group enmity.

This obviously captures NATO’s Cold War reality. NATO started out as an exclusive alliance. The external security dilemma triggered its very existence.
Threat perceptions were intense and NATO was perceived as irreplaceable. However, threat perceptions oscillated during the Cold War. Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, NATO began to adopt a more persuasive approach based on detente, arms control and confidence-building. This intensified once the “Corbinian factor” unfolded. European security governance became more inclusive, NATO increasingly hybrid.

1989–90 was a system shock whose impact unfolded only over time. System shocks have an epicenter where change is most profound and they send shockwaves of decreasing intensity across the international system. The Soviet Union was the epicenter of 1989–90; the shock waves overturned the regimes in Central Eastern Europe, made German unification possible and transformed bipolarity into unipolarity. The effect on well-established Western institutions like NATO, however, was unclear. After all, the “West” witnessed the “triumph of liberal capitalism” — and it seemed that “hanging tough paid off” (Gaddis 1989). George H. W. Bush had reason to “dance on the Wall.” Why should NATO change? 1989–90 was a “rectifying revolution” (Habermas); a “long and tragic digression that was the Communist illusion” finally came to an end. “Back to Europe” (Havel) was its leitmotiv, and those advocating a “third path” were marginalized. However, most obviously, NATO’s core article 5 lost its immediate relevance. The basic rationale for NATO’s creation in 1949 vanished. European security governance was moving from collective defense to a new, more inclusive and cooperative form of governance. The joint American–Soviet effort to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in January 1991 nurtured hopes for the realization of the “four policemen” concept of collective security that Roosevelt had envisioned in 1945. NATO appeared obsolete, particularly among Germans. In spring 1990, only 16 percent of them still favored NATO’s continuing existence, 54 percent favored the creation of a new European security system, 20 percent opted for neutrality and 49 percent advocated a US troop withdrawal from Germany (Biermann 1997: 483–484). If the need to re-legitimize NATO was obvious.

The alliance reacted in three consecutive steps, corresponding to organizational theory: first, denial of a need to change; then affirmation of that need as the legitimacy crisis unfolded; finally adaptation “to expand the base of support” (McCalla 1996: 428). The attainment of NATO membership for united Germany consolidated NATO at a critical juncture. Equally as important was the fact that the strong aspirations of all the Central European countries to join NATO pointed to its continuing attractiveness. Perceptions in Western and Eastern Europe on NATO’s relevance sharply diverged, due to different geopolitics and historical experience. Ironically, it was NATO’s collective defense function that drew countries like Poland or the Baltic states into NATO. The agonizing and protracted debates on the pros and cons of enlargement and NATO’s “out-of-area” role in Bosnia, coupled with a lack of US leadership until 1994, demonstrated how much NATO’s entire raison d’être was in doubt.

NATO’s hybrid nature increased in the process of transformation. Two new institutional purposes moved up front: conflict resolution and partnership. As to conflict resolution, the shift was strongly motivated by Senator R. Lugar’s warning that the alliance would either go “out of area or out of business.” After much wavering and bickering, it was the alliance which ended “ethnic cleansing” both in Bosnia and in Kosovo. The instruments were both competence (the NATO air campaigns in Bosnia 1995 and in Kosovo 1999) and assurance (post-conflict peace building in Bosnia and Kosovo, later also in Macedonia).

The “new NATO,” or NATO III in Helga Haftendorf’s (2002) count, began to pursue broader mission goals. The alliance multiplied its network of cooperation. NATO staff became deeply involved in all kinds of partnership activities, centering on a continuously expanded Partnership of Peace program. The rationale was, first, to prepare Central Eastern Europe for membership through a process of norm diffusion which focused on civil control of the military, second, to stabilize those in the neighborhood not willing or able to join NATO; and third, to build up the capacities of partners and future members to effectively contribute to NATO’s peace operations. Thus, the alliance assumed security management functions of an inclusive, risk-oriented nature (Kosban and Wallander 1989: 45).

With this new raison d’être, the first post-Cold War debate on NATO’s relevance subsided. Opinion polls reflected this shift. In 1996, 69 percent of Germans, 71 percent of Britons and 54 percent of the French recognized NATO as “essential” again (Ziegler 1998: 16). Persisting doubts in Washington, which increasingly pressed to make NATO available for its global agenda, were dispelled once NATO moved into Afghanistan after 9/11. Today, the alliance has assumed global security governance tasks: training security forces in Iraq and African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, providing airisf for the latter, patrolling in the Mediterranean and being engaged in disaster relief work such as in Pakistan. Thus, NATO reinvented itself as a major actor both in European and global security governance. Where is the problem then, Atlantacists might ask?

Transatlantic decoupling

The alliance was built on two pillars: collective defense and the transatlantic link. After 1989, attention was concentrated on how to re-legitimize NATO by substituting collective defense. What went largely unnoticed was how much 11/9 impacted on the transatlantic link.

Throughout the Cold War, “coupling” was the formula linking the American ally as closely possible to the European “theater.” Europe was the focal point of a global confrontation. For the Americans, control of Western Europe, legitimized through bi-polar hegemony, was pivotal; for the Europeans, the US “umbrella” was indispensable. It was, though, “an unnatural – even abstruse – situation” (Howorth 2007: 52), dictated by an existential threat which drew the partners together.

Once that threat faded, mutual dependence came to an end. For American global design, Europe lost its geostategic prominence. The decline of its world power status dates back to 1945 and now the consequences had to be faced. The reduction of American forces in Europe (from 315,000 in 1989 to 98,000 in 2005) and their redeployment elsewhere signaled this decline, as did the early US disengagement from the Balkan wars, following Secretary of State Baker's...
1991 dictum “We don’t have a dog in this fight” (Silber and Little 1995: 201). Such disengagement in a major European crisis was unthinkable a few years before. Obviously, the Europeans had to prepare for contingencies where the US and thus NATO were not prepared to act (Howorth 2007: 53).

The disengagement was accelerated by 9/11 and the shifting US focus towards the Middle East and China. The US Quadrennial Defense Review which appeared just after 9/11 argued that “Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition” (three paragraphs devoted to this issue), whereas Europe is “largely at peace” (one paragraph devoted to this issue). Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command commented: “In the past...the ‘Big Three’ regions have always been Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia, and in that order...Now you find that East Asia comes first, Southwest Asia second and Europe third.”

For the Europeans, “coupling” also lost urgency. During the Cold War, any move to seriously undercut the US presence was taboo, even for France. The threat of a US troop withdrawal limited European “free riding.” Without the Soviet threat, “extended deterrence,” “first use” and the forward deployment of US forces on European soil lost relevance. The case with which NATO downplayed its nuclear deterrent and the US withdrew its nuclear weapons and troops demonstrate how much transatlantic coupling eroded.

Instead of falling back into the coupling rhetoric, the Europeans began to pursue their own policy preferences. Sometimes they now assumed a leadership role themselves, such as when they encouraged American abstention from the Yugoslav theater, asserting “Washington is being kept informed but it is not being consulted.” On occasions they acted against explicit American preferences, for example when they recognized Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and when they dismissed Clinton’s “lift and strike” initiative. Throughout the Balkan wars American and European mediation efforts competed up to blatant obstruction as in the case of the Vance-Owen plan (Biermann 2005).

Thus, the transatlantic partnership lost its preeminence once the external security referent disappeared and NATO’s cohesion suffered. The more the Cold War relaxed its mental hold, the more this ideational shift unfolded. Since it occurred gradually, its implications were overlooked. The statement of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2005 that the American presence “is no longer the security policy priority that it used to be” reflected a widely accepted reality. US-European relations returned to the pre-1945 patterns of cooperation and rivalry. The Cold War had just been an intermezzo. The wider public took notice only when the allies clashed over Iraq in 2003.

European “emanicipation”

NATO spans across the Atlantic and into Central Asia, including three non-European members with quite distinct security cultures (Canada, Turkey, and the US). It was originally conceived with a Westphalian logic, corresponding to the basic outlook of all its member-states. However, since the 1950s Europe began to turn towards pooled sovereignty, establishing supranational institutions, introducing qualified majority voting, striving to overcome the separating qualities of borders, cultivating the image of a civilian power and moving into a coordination even of foreign policy.

It is for this reason that Europe serves as the template for much of the security governance literature today. Most authors assume that the “logic of anarchy and power...drives the international system outside the narrow ambit of Europe” (Sporring 2007: 282). It is in Europe that a post-Westphalian security community has emerged with a unique “prevalence of peace and cooperation” (Webber 2007: 51). Major norms of this converging European security culture, such as an inclination to multilateralism or to the restrained use of force, emerged already during the Cold War (Meyer 2006).

NATO’s lead nation did not follow this liberal internationalist turn of governance (Krahmann 2005b). Indeed, the EU disposition for pooled sovereignty was quite “incomprehensible” to US foreign policy makers” (Higgett 2005: 581). The US remained a “late-Westphalian state” (Sporring 2007: 283). As a consequence, NATO was already during the Cold War more diverse internally than the EU, despite much heterogeneity also within the EU (Hyde-Price 2004). Sporring (Introduction, this volume) tags the EU a post-Westphalian, and NATO a Westphalian security community.

The consequences of Europe’s turn towards pooled sovereignty for NATO’s security community character were hardly discussed during the Cold War. The more Europe moved toward a distinct, postmodern identity and America remained late-Westphalian, the more intra-alliance tensions on the very basics of NATO’s raison d’être had to emerge. As European identities shifted, strains within the organization increased: while the US clung much more to traditional strategies and instruments of statecraft, the Europeans began to prefer new strategies and instruments. NATO was the primary arena where these differences in “Westphalianness” clashed.

These differences were aggravated by the structural imbalance within the alliance. From the beginning, the alliance was strongly asymmetric, “Hegemony [was] mirrored by dependence” (Howorth 2007: 52). Issues of burden-sharing and leadership style were on the agenda at an early stage. In 1949, the Europeans had dragged a reluctant America into the assistance pledge for Europe (Wiebes and Zeeman 1983). The far-sighted argument of the “third force” advocates in Washington that NATO will only endure if Europe is a strong independent pole in world politics with equal “veto opportunities” (Hirschman 1970) within the alliance was not seized by the Europeans. They were just interested in quick fixes such as a maximum of US aid (Weber 1992: 641-643). Still, the US agreed to an alliance that was strongly multilateral in character based on the “one member—one vote” principle and the consensus rule.

However, there was a countervailing US interest in unrestrained leadership (Council on Foreign Relations 2004: 14). It began to dominate alliance politics once Kennedy turned towards “flexible response” in the early 1960s, which required “unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central
direction" (Weber 1992: 673). Nuclear strategy triumphed over alliance politics. Reflecting on the subsequent years, the former British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe remarked, "More and more Europeans were coming to feel that ... the governments had no real influence on America's strategic thinking and that established NATO mechanisms for consultation risked becoming uni-directional" (quoted in Rees 1998: 24).

This increasingly collided with the post-war rise of Europe. The "entire American-West European relationship had to be redefined" (Lundestad 1996: 275). However, beyond rhetoric, this did not take place within NATO. The result was cumulative tensions, ranging from Suez to MLF, Yom Kippur and SDA. The Europeans began to experiment with institutional alternatives. The revitalization of the WEU since 1984 as a Europe-only security caucus signaled their growing discontent with NATO. They wanted to coordinate security policy without Washington at the table (Rees 1998: 22–26). Still, the external security dilemma constrained them.

When the Soviet threat disappeared, this constraint was removed. Transatlantic decoupling opened the door to conceptualize European security beyond NATO. The Europeans began to call loudly for a "new transatlantic bargain." But what should it look like? Atlanticist and Europeanist views were diametrically opposed. The split ran right through Europe. The rivalry Franco-German and British-Italian proposals in Maastricht of October 1991 (which were basically re-tabled in Amsterdam) revealed how much both differed on NATO's future relevance relative to the EU and the WEU (Mens et al. 1992: 109–111). The Europeanists around France, which was increasingly joined by Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, revived Kennedy's two-pillar idea and called for equal voice opportunities in a re-balanced alliance. They became more willing to articulate their grievances, pursue national agendas within NATO and probe alternative forms of defense. Public opinion shifted accordingly. After the 1991 Gulf War, 75 percent of EU citizens favored adopting a common foreign policy to deal with such crises, 61 percent even supported establishing a European military intervention force (Eurobarometer 35 1991: 28).

The new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, which was initiated in Maastricht and deepened in Amsterdam, moved the EU gradually into NATO's domain. The Atlanticists (Britain, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal), supported by the neutrals, were able to limit the impact on NATO. Still, an EU defense option was on the horizon once the Maastricht treaty formulated the perspective of a "progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defence" (article 9). NATO and the EU were increasingly perceived as "two competing forms of European security governance" (Sperling, Introduction, this volume).

Thus, the "correlation of forces" (Cox 2005: 226–227) was shifting. The reasons were both exogenous and endogenous. Without the Soviet threat, European dependence on the US declined. Also, with European integration moving into Economic, Monetary and Political Union, the post-Westphalian EU was increasingly perceived by many as the primary and, indeed, superior European reference point even in foreign and security affairs. Indeed, the logic of European integration implied a spill-over to the defense realm at some point in time. Institutional preferences thus began to shift towards the EU – first in France, then in Germany, at last also in Britain (Howorth 2007: 146–160).

In contrast, the US position moved towards a more imperial exercise of leadership. From a "Westphalian" point of view America had attained global hegemony. The central realist parameter to measure relative power, military capabilities, did not suggest re-balancing the alliance; indeed, the "capabilities gap" was dramatically widening. Once crisis management became the centerpiece of NATO's raison d'être, force projection counted most. Thus, Washington was hardly inclined to attenuate US primacy. Already the Bush administration issued stiff warnings not to duplicate the alliance (Duke 1994: 172–173). Although the Clinton administration in a profound policy turn began to advocate a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO in 1994, not least to ward off any European initiative outside NATO, European ambitions soon met US resistance, especially in the arduous NATO-WEU negotiations on European-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (Demirkes 2005a: 69–72).

The US-dominated Dayton negotiations in 1995 and particularly the air campaign against Serbia in 1999 dramatically revealed the magnitude of European dependence (Brenner 2005: 9–12, 29–32). Much as the Suez experience in 1956 inspired Britain and France to acquire their independent nuclear forces and de Gaulle to demand a redistribution of power within the alliance, the experience with US unilateralism now inspired European "emancipation" (Cogan 2001).

The dispute regarding the allocation of command posts in a reformed command structure, particularly Allied Forces in Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, revealed how much the European call for re-balancing was frustrated. Thus, NATO was increasingly perceived as insufficient to meet distinct European interests. Even if the historic turnaround of Tony Blair in Saint Malo was motivated primarily by the quest "to save NATO" by "silencing the voices of isolationism" in Washington (Howorth 2000: 34), it also testified to transatlantic decoupling and a new willingness in London to build a European autonomous defense capacity outside NATO. The impasse among "Atlanticists" and "Europeans," which had protected NATO's primary since the 1960s and prevented any alternative venue from rising, was overcome.

The ESDF was the result of shifting institutional preferences. This shift has continued since and inspired the growth of the ESDF. Atlanticists have discovered the added value of the SDSF. This now includes even Central Eastern European countries such as Poland. The ESDF is increasingly duplicating NATO – in terms of scope, institutions, capabilities and missions. Its focus on civilian missions and peace-building, however, also reflects European post-Westphalian preferences. Gerhard Schröder asserted in 2005, "We are formulating it [German foreign and security policy] in Europe, for Europe and from Europe." This is backed by public opinion. In 2001, 43 percent of Europeans argued that decisions on European defense should be taken by the EU, 17 percent by NATO, 24 percent by the national governments. This attitude was most pronounced in Italy and France,
least in the UK (Special Eurobarometer 146 2001: 11–13). At the height of the Iraq campaign, two years later, 67 percent of the French, 63 percent of Italians, 52 percent of Germans and 48 percent of Britons (but only 20 percent of Americans) wanted US-European ties to be “more independent” (Pew Research Center 2003: 2).

Summing up, the creation of the ESDP was triggered both by an exogenous factor, the demise of the Soviet threat which allowed for more European “emancipation,” and an exogenous factor, the rise of the post-Westphalian security community within the EU. The price, though, was not only an estrangement of the alliance leader, but also a decline of NATO’s relevance, both in terms of its utility for the Europeans and of its internal cohesion. The increasing calls for making direct EU-US consultation the dominant forum for the transatlantic security dialogue demonstrates how much loyalties have shifted. These changes were imposed on the US and NATO, and both are still adapting to the new situation in European security governance.

The multiplication of security providers in Europe

The creation of the ESDP was the culmination of a process of actor multiplication in European security governance. Already during the Cold War, the number of institutions with a security dimension continuously increased. The Western Union, founded one year before NATO, and its successor organization, the WEU, had an even more binding collective defense clause than NATO. The European Community restricted itself to a loose foreign policy coordination since 1969; however, European Political Cooperation successively moved into the non-military dimensions of security, several times explicitly challenging US leadership, such as on Afghanistan and SDI (Nuttall 1998). Also, the CSCE, founded in 1975, became an instrument for inter-bloc confidence-building, arms control and norm setting. Thus, potential rival organizations of NATO were in place when the wall fell.

In the 1990s, the definition of what security is constantly expanded. NATO is acting today in a reframed ideational milieu with a broadened understanding of security, and this far more in Europe (and Canada) than in the United States. Some threats – such as global terrorism – have newly emerged; others – such as proliferation, failing states and trafficking of humans, drugs and small arms – have re-surfaced; and still others – such as migration, energy supply, environmental degradation or pandemics – have been “securitised.” Most of these threats stem from non-state actors, are transnational in nature and target society at large (Kirchner 2007b: 5). States are neither the source nor the target of most threats. This puts into question “the utility of traditional forms of governance, including a collective defence arrangement like NATO, in meeting the challenges of the contemporary threat environment” (Sperling Introduction, this volume).

NATO was the evident first choice to deal with these post-Cold War security risks. Whether it would be assigned the new tasks became a litmus test for NATO’s utility in the new security environment. Given its post-Westphalian turn, “civilian power” Europe perceived the new risks as primarily non-military, preferring civilian means to deal with them (Manners 2002). The US elite neither shared nor fully grasped this new post-Westphalian reality in Western Europe (Berenkoetter 2004; Brenner 2002; Kagan 2004). Security concepts increasingly diverged on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, while the European Security Strategy of 2003 argues that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (European Union 2003: 3), the US is capable and determined to disregard institutional solutions and international law if necessary.

Thus, the delegation of mandates, tasks and resources to deal with the new security risks proved highly controversial. Washington preferred to concentrate authority within NATO. However, the Europeans often favor other venues, some of which, such as ESDP missions, do not need US approval. As a consequence, European security governance has moved from single-actor dominance (NATO) to a multi-actor setting of horizontal networking. Governments can select from a broad menu of options to respond to security threats. Mandates, tasks and resources are dispersed among actors.

NATO’s relevance is most challenged by the ESDP. Its core competence, collective defense, is still officially reserved for NATO; yet if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, its solidarity clause on terrorism and particularly its mutual assistance clause will give the EU a nascent collective defense dimension (Howorth 2007: 117–124). In military crisis management, NATO is first choice for high-intensity operations, such as Afghanistan, and will remain so for quite some time. However, NATO already handed the Bosnian mission over to the EU and will do the same in Kosovo. The more the EU acquires capabilities such as the battle groups to tackle the more robust “Petersberg tasks,” the less the EU needs NATO, i.e. US assets and capabilities for military crisis management, and the more NATO becomes an instrument of choice. Only two out of 24 EU operations so far (“Concordia” in Macedonia and “Althea” in Bosnia) were based on the “Berlin plus agreements.” Many Europeans are no longer willing to yield to NATO’s primacy, essentially claiming a right to forum shop pragmatically between NATO, the EU, the OSCE and other security providers (Reicherc 2006: 147–170).

There is a widespread image in Europe of NATO as a still basically military alliance which should not be entrusted to deal with risks of a political dimension. This is not only true for global warming and energy dependence (dealt with mainly on the UN, G8 and EU levels). It is also true for civil crisis management, the significance of which NATO has acknowledged in its 2006 “Comprehensive Political Guidance” (Yost 2007: 21–23). NATO’s headquarters and the US are eager to take over major responsibilities in this realm, too, with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan serving as prototypes. Many Europeans have reservations (Yost 2007: 26, 150, 155–156). The OSCE already has major civilian crisis management capabilities, e.g. its long-term missions. Also, since 2000, the EU has rapidly taken the lead in this field, building on its unique comparative advantage to integrate its broad range of instruments into one comprehensive, “inter-pillar” approach, thus reflecting its dominant post-Westphalian understanding of security today (Nowak 2006).
If we move on to the “terrorism-tyrants-WMD” triangle, the interconnected threats of terrorism, failing states, and proliferation that dominated the Bush administration’s agenda, even here NATO is just one actor among others and not the primary one. All these threats are primarily met by a combination of national US endeavors and varying “coalitions” (such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea or Operation Enduring Freedom on terrorism), supported by different international organizations (such as the IAEA on Iran). Most of these threats are of a global nature, and NATO has to share responsibility with other major players.

Summing up, multiple security providers compete today for mandates, tasks and resources, both in Europe and globally. At first sight, the cause is shifting threat perceptions: different providers capable of meeting specific threats. Many of these, being non-military, did not meet NATO’s traditional profile, and so providers multiplied. However, the choice of security providers is an institutional selection process. Security providers can be adapted to perform new tasks. This depends on the willingness of member-states to do so. They decided on the amount of transformation of NATO. Beyond doubt, they delegated substantial new mandates and resources to NATO to make it relevant for the new security environment. However, whereas the US elite preferred to hand over most responsibility for post-Cold War security governance to NATO, the Europeans limited NATO’s transformation and entrusted major security tasks to other organizations. They did so either unilaterally within European-only institutions or by blocking US initiatives within a consensus-ruled NATO.

The result is mixed for NATO. It lost exclusiveness in European security, but moved into global security governance; however, here it is just one, and not the primary security provider among many. It retained the leadership on collective defense, but the ESDP is increasingly encroaching in this domain. It gained a new core competence in military crisis management, but is increasingly challenged by a rivaling ESDP-autonomous capability in and beyond Europe. It tries to increase its role in civilian crisis management and cooperative activities, yet is confined to a secondary role in this field which gained most prominence in post-Cold War security governance.

**America’s de-prioritization of NATO**

Throughout NATO history, US administrations were the engines of alliance transformation. This is still true today — be it “global partnerships,” the next enlargement round or the NATO Response Force. However, this “persistent US proacking” (Schmidt 2006–7: 98) is motivated by a growing sentiment in Washington that NATO is of decreasing utility as a tool of US grand design.

The American capability-oriented Westphalian perspective is at the heart of the matter. Whereas many Europeans deeply doubt the usefulness of military means to achieve political ends, US administrations still privilege those parameters of hard power that America dominates. They point to the fact that the US spends more than the next (in order of military expenditure) 15 countries together on defense, two and a half times more than the EU defense budgets combined in 2006. Also, the American R&D budget on defense excels the European Union aggregate almost six times (European Defence Agency 2007). Still, only 15,000 to 20,000 European troops out of 1.7 million are at any time available for “serious military missions” (Howorth 2007: 104).

American impatience with its NATO allies increased throughout the 1990s. At that time, it was the Euro-centric focus and the slow shift to force projection which reduced NATO’s relevance for Washington. The interpressive European agenda clashed with the US ambition to make NATO relevant for the American global agenda and the slow transformation of major European forces, which were rarely deployed beyond Europe before, contrasted with the American focus on force projection.

The shock of the Gulf War of 1991, when only 15,000 out of 283,000 French forces could be deployed abroad, triggered the Defense Review processes both in France and Great Britain (Howorth 2007: 98). Yet, in the Kosovo air campaign, the combination of the striking US air power dominance and European “softness” in terms of targeting and collateral damage in a consensus-ruled NATO led the Clinton administration to blatantly sideline the North Atlantic Council by establishing purely national channels of communication with the American SAC/CEUR. Still, what was perceived as European foot-dragging afterwards mobilized calls in Washington to either change the consensus rule within NATO (Michel 2003) or to avoid this kind of coalition warfare in the future altogether (Bremer 2002: 26–33). The notorious statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld well reflected the American frustration: Wars “should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we can’t afford that.”

The attacks of 9/11, the first major system shock after 11/9, first appeared to offer NATO a new sense of mission. However, Gerhard Schröder’s call for “unconditional solidarity” and Le Monde’s declaration that “we are all Americans” revolved into the deepest crisis NATO experienced so far (Pond 2004). The 9/11 attacks had, much more than 11/9, a deeply asymmetric ideological impact on the allies. This time the epicenter of the system shock was in the US, whereas Europe declined “to be defined” (Ash 2001: 68). America experienced “the most sweeping reorientation of US grand strategy in over half a century” (Council on Foreign Relations 2004: 2). “It shattered the [American] sense of physical invulnerability and defined US policy ‘in every conceivable dimension’” (Daulard 2003: 158).

The US strategic agenda became distinctly more Westphalian: exclusive in the sense of dividing strictly between these for and those against “us” in the “global war on terrorism”; preoccupied with the territorial integrity of the “homeland”; subordinating multilateral approaches and international law to national security; and privileging coercive, hard power instruments. US threat perceptions today fundamentally diverge from those in Europe, with America declaring war and the EU responding that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (European Union 2003: 1). Assessments about the root causes and the appropriate
instruments for fighting terrorism strongly diverge (Berenschotter and Giegerich 2008b, versus Shepard 2006). Europe is hardly an attractive partner for the new US security agenda. Decision-making within NATO has become even more arduous.

Thus, NATO's first-time invocation of article 5 after 9/11 and its far-reaching offer of assistance were met with indifference in Washington. When the Bush administration designed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it "did not give any thought to acting through NATO," according to a former official (Schmidt 2006:7:104). NATO took over major responsibility in Afghanistan (ISAF), yet the US still relies on OEF to fight the Taliban. The refusal of major European allies to expand the ISAF mandate and the multitude of national caveats seriously reduces NATO's effectiveness in American eyes (Kaim 2006). Even more so, NATO is hardly present in the theater, which, during the Bush presidency, commanded almost exclusive US domestic attention, namely Iraq. NATO thus became one of the "victims of 9/11" (Hafendorfer 2002).

Imperial inclinations towards the European allies were always present in American politics. They were never fully shared. However, they gained considerable ground for three reasons. First, the "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer) of 1989 allows American diplomacy to opt for non-institutional, i.e. non-NATO approaches to an extent not conceivable before. Second, the long-standing transatlantic security culture gap has widened significantly since 9/11. The more Americans and Europeans diverge in their "Westphalianism," the more their fundamental choices as to ends and means of security governance differ. This stimulates mutual frustration and a temptation to act unilaterally. Third, the US has resorted to an ad hoc coalition approach many times before - yet only in recent years did the alliance turn global and thus available for global tasks. Not using NATO today implies sidestepping it. America engineered the globalization of NATO, yet in global security governance its relative relevance has become most obvious.

Conclusions

Let us step back and take a macro view of today's security governance and NATO's place within. Is the security governance lens helpful to assess the relevance of individual security providers within such a governance system? How was NATO's relevance affected by 11/9 and 9/11? Is NATO's relative decline that we observed permanent or reversible?

The security governance approach has both added value and limits when approaching the empirical question posed here. Research on security governance is still in an embryonic stage. Conceptualizations strongly differ, inspiring cherry-picking approaches. This investigation followed Spelling's conceptualization in the introduction to this volume. It privileges, itself, some features of security governance while marginalizing others. This might be unavoidable for an emerging research program. In the longer run, a core of accepted propositions on security governance is indispensable if we aim at cumulative research.

The relevance of one actor within a governance system can only be investigated by combining an exogenous and an endogenous perspective. The security governance approach is most helpful in investigating the exogenous perspective. I have demonstrated that two variables have strong explanatory power: the embeddedness of individual security providers which allows assessing their relative relevance within a multiactor network of governance, and threat perceptions which condition the utility of individual providers to meet those threats over time.

Endogenous variables constantly figured in Spelling's bottom-up approach, explaining different types of security governance systems with different degrees of "Westphalianism" of its constituent parts, proved useful in complementing the system perspective usually predominant in security governance research. Without a close look at domestic-level factors, especially security cultures and their impact on policy, the relevance of individual security providers could hardly be assessed. This is particularly true for organizations composed of states with diverging preferences.

Distinguishing types of security governance over time and across regions, as Spelling recommends, is the key for any security governance research in the future that aspires to compare governance systems across time and space. We need conceptualizations which are not confined to post-Cold War Europe. Also, we need to think more about how transitions from one governance system to another take place, especially in times of rapid change. For cross-regional comparisons threat perceptions and degrees of "Westphalianism" appear to be good starting-points.

System shocks provoke tectonic shifts, setting security governance on a markedly different path. They affect governance in several ways. First, they give rise to new threats and downplay old ones. They thus shift security agendas, trigger the transformation of existing security providers and stimulate the emergence of new providers. Second, system shocks might impact security cultures quite differently, some change more radically in terms of "Westphalianism" than others. As a consequence, discord as to the strategies and instruments to meet the new threats might increase. Individual security providers are such instruments.

How was NATO's relevance affected by 11/9 and 9/11? This chapter has privileged the 1990s, because analysts during those years strongly misperceived how much NATO's legitimacy, utility and cohesiveness eroded once the "overlay" (Buzan and Waever 2003: 61) of bipolarity was lifted. Focusing on NATO's new functions in crisis management, partnership and integration was short-sighted. Indeed, NATO compensated the demise of collective defense by expanding its functional and geographical scope. Transformation brought about re-legitimization. However, the "taken for grantedness" that this impacted was premature. Transformation averted dissolution, but not decline. It was the ideational effect of 11/9 on threat perceptions and the transatlantic partnership, including NATO-EU relations, which proved most erosive. The "magnitude" of this tectonic shift was grasped late, and only by some (Andrews 2004: 4).

NATO's second crisis of legitimacy after 9/11 was predetermined by its first one. Unfortunately, the reaction to 9/11 not only revealed the extent of this shift but hastened it. Again, the effect was mainly ideational, as security cultures
leaving or dissolving the alliance; indeed, it is still expanding, and its attractiveness among countries such as Georgia or Ukraine is high. It remains true that "no countries are more likely to agree on basic policy, and to have the power to do something about it" (Moravcsik 2003). Europe and America remain pivotal partners for a healthy world economy, for fighting terrorism, and for advancing democracy. Although only 36 percent of Europeans today view US leadership as desirable (down from 64 percent in 2002), still a majority (54 percent) wants to address threats "in partnership" with the US (Transatlantic Trends 2007: 5, 12, 16).

Whether or not the allies learn to cope with divergence and re-frame their partnership according to post-Cold War realities will, to a significant degree, determine the future not only of the Atlantic alliance but of governance worldwide.

Notes
1. The views expressed in this text are solely the author's and do not reflect the stance of any of the institutions he is affiliated with.
2. I would like to thank the editors of this volume for their valuable guidance as well as David M. Andrews, Felix Bemelkotter, Matthias Dembinski and especially David Yost for commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter.
3. For the realist argument, see Mearsheimer (1990), Waltz (1993) and Walt (1997); for the constructivist and neoliberal argument see Wallander (2000), and McCalla (1996). Both arguments are confronted in Heldmann and Wolff (1993).
5. Risse: "It is domestic politics, stupid, rather than structural changes in the international system that has made the Atlantic a wider ocean" (2004: 233).
6. Note that this typology implies a notion of progress, i.e. a teleological dimension, which is as yet not empirically tested.
7. Spelling diverges here considerably from the literature, which implies that security governance is a new term for a new phenomenon, which arose in the post-Cold War context. He effectively argues that different type of security governance have existed before 1989 and still exist today. This allows the analysis of NATO's evolution over time from one coherent analytical framework, and it permits the comparison of forms of governance across regions.
10. When asked whether NATO is still essential, 53 percent still agreed in 1990 (Ziegler 1998).
3 The EU in global security governance
Lessons for conceptual development

Arita Eriksson

Introduction: the concept of governance in relation to security and the global context

In developing the concept of security governance, one research task is to elaborate on characteristics and to fill the concept with content based on empirical studies (as argued by, for example, Sperling 2007). As the concept is comparatively young, its theoretical development needs feedback from empirical studies. Analysing the European Union (EU) civil and military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a way of capturing security governance in a global context, compared to a regional one. These operations provide good illustrations of different forms of security governance that allow the researcher to capture a great deal of various interaction patterns. It also makes further theorizing concerning global security governance possible, for example through identifying whether or not the components of security governance spelled out by Webber et al. (2004) are present. As this definition is often used as something of a starting point for an analysis of security governance, it is interesting to analyse its applicability in various contexts. Does security governance have important components that are still unexplored? What different forms may security governance take? How can security governance shed light on universal security efforts? Keohane (2001) has identified five main functions of institutions of global governance. The first is to limit the use of violence, the second is to manage problems that spill over from the different parts of the system to other parts, the third is to "provide focal points in coordination games" (Keohane 2001: 3), the fourth is to handle major disturbances and the fifth is to "provide a guarantee against the worst forms of abuse" (Keohane 2001: 3). Though Keohane’s argument is not limited to security policy, these functions may well fit the discussion concerning security governance as defined by Webber et al., even though we are not speaking of a particular physical institution here, but rather of a cooperation network engaged in security efforts within the framework of international law. We will return to the issue of functions in the conclusion, and also relate these to the categories of governance identified by Sperling in the introduction to this volume.

Security politics at the global level at the beginning of the twenty-first century are torn between traditional state centrist perspectives which represent